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BEHIND THE FACADE: UNDERSTANDING THE
POTENTIAL EXTENSION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
TO HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll
stick to what's legal .... I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right
and wrong, which you find such plainsailing I can't navigate, I'm no
voyager. I
Since the days of ancient Sodom, laws have proscribed homosexual
conduct.2 American prohibitions on sodomy are as old as American his-
tory itself.' These laws, whether based on religion,4 medical understand-
ing,5 or "natural law,"6 reflect society's disdain for homosexuality.
I. R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, act I at 147 (1967), quoted in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2303 (1978) by Chief Justice Burger.
2. The word "sodomy" comes from the Biblical city of Sodom, which, according to the Bible,
God destroyed because of its citizens' evil practices. Genesis 19: 1-29. Judaic law specifically prohib-
ited homosexual sodomy. The punishment for homosexual sodomy was death. Leviticus 20:13.
3. The Jamestown colony prohibited sodomy. For the Colony in Virginia Britannia: Laws
Divine, Moral, and Martial Etc., art. 9, at 12 (London 1612) (comp. by W. Strachery 1969) ("No
man shall commit the horrible, and detestable sins of Sodomie upon pain of death; .... ") The old
English "buggery" statute of 1533, which made the "detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery" a
capital crime, provided the historical roots of the Jamestown prohibition. 25 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1533).
After the Revolution, Virginia passed its own "buggery" statute, which retained the penalty of
death. 1 S. SHEPARD, THE STATUTE AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 1792 TO 1806 113 (1970). Most states
followed Virginia's pattern. MUELLER, SEXUAL CONDUCT AND THE LAW 41 (2d ed. 1980).
4. The early Christian Church, relying in part on Old Testament prohibitions, believed that
homosexuality was deviant and should be punished. See Romans 1: 26-27 ("men likewise gave up
natural relations with women and were consumed with passion for one another, men committing
shameless acts with men"); 1 Corinthians 6: 9-10 ("neither this immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulter-
ers, nor homosexuals, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers will
inherit the kingdom of God"); See also supra note 2. But see J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL
TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING
OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 117 (1980) (the New Testament takes no
demonstrable position on homosexuality).
Thomas Aquinas cataloged homosexuality as a sin against God. He reasoned that God created
men and women as sexual beings only for procreation. He considered sodomy a noncreative plea-
sure of the flesh, and therefore in conflict with man's spiritual destiny. 43 T. AQUINAS, Summa
Theologica 246-249 (T. Gilby ed. 1968).
5. At one time, the American Psychiatric Association labeled homosexuality as a "mental
disorder" and classified it as a "sexual deviation." In general, psychiatrists believed homosexuals
were ill because they failed to conform to the prevailing cultural norms. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-I) 38-39 (1952).
Later, the association retained the "mental disorder," but categorized homosexuality under "person-
ality disorders." A personality disorder is a deeply ingrained maladaptive pattern of behavior, but is
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Recently, however, various groups have attempted to mobilize public
support for changes in sodomy laws.7 Although twenty-one states have
decriminalized sodomy,' twenty-four have chosen9 to retain their
different from psychiatric and neurotic symptoms. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-II) (1968) DSM III.
6. 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 215 (Lewis's ed. 1897) (referring to sodomy as "the infa-
mous crime against nature, committed with either man or beast... the very mention of which is a
disgrace to human nature.").
The young American states copied Blackstone's language in their sodomy statutes, using such
language as "unnatural" or crimes against nature. See, e.g., Va. Code § 18.2-361 (1982):
Crimes against nature.-If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute
animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth,
or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 6
felony.
7. Homosexuals began to organize in 1961 following a riot outside a bar in New York's
Greenwich Village. Police had beaten a man outside a bar frequented by homosexuals. Homosexu-
als adopted the term "gay," meaning celebration, for their movement. See generally P. Simpson,
From the Closet to the Courts (1976).
8. The following states have decriminalized consensual sodomy between adult homosexuals:
Alaska, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 166 (effective Jan. 1, 1980); California, 1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 71,
§ 7 (effective July 1, 1976); Colorado, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 121, § (approved June 2, 1971);
Connecticut, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts. 828, § 214 (effective Oct. 1, 1971); Delaware, 58 Del. Laws, ch.
497, § 1 (effective Apr. 1, 1973); Hawaii, 1972 Hawaii Sess. Laws, act 9, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1983);
Illinois, 1961 Ill. Laws, pt. 1983, § 11-2 (effective Jan. 1, 1962); Indiana, 1976 Ind. Acts. P.L. 148,
§ 24 (effective July 1, 1977); Iowa, Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, § 520 (effective Jan. 1, 1978); Maine, 1975
Me. Acts. ch. 499, § 5 (effective Mary. 1, 1976); Nebraska, 1977 Neb. Laws L.B. 38, § 328 (effective
July 1, 1978); New Hampshire, 1978 N.H. Laws, 532: 26 (effective Nov. 1, 1973); New Jersey, 1978
N.J. Laws, cl. 95, § 2C:98-2 effective Sept. 1, 1979); New Mexico, 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § 8;
North Dakota, 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 122, § 1 (effective Mary. 19, 1977); Ohio, 1972 Ohio Laws,
134 v H 511, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1974); Oregon, 1971 Or. Laws, ch. 743, § 432 (167.040) (effective
Jan. 1, 1972); South Dakota, 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 158, § 22-8 (effective Apr. 1, 1977); Vermont,
1977 Vt. Acts, no. 51, § 3 (effective July 1, 1977); Washington, 1975 Wash. Laws, 1st esec. Sess., ch.
260 (effective July 1, 1976); West Virginia, 1976 W. Va. Acts, ch. 43 (effective June 11, 1976);
Wyoming, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 70, § 3 (effective May 27, 1977).
9. The following states prohibit various forms of private consensual sodomy. "Modern defini-
tion" statutes exclude the conduct of married couples. Alabama, Ala. Code § 13A-6-64 to -65
(1982) (modern definition); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1978 & Supp. 1983-
84) (common law definition; "infamous crime against nature"); Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813
(1977) (modern definition; homosexual acts only); District of Columbia, D.C. Code Ann. § 2203502
(Michie 1981) (modern definition); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 800.2 (West 1976) ("unnatural and
lascivious acts"); Idaho, Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (common law definition); Kansas, Dan. Stat.
Ann. § 21-3505 (West Supp. 1984) (modern definition); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100 (1975)
(modern definition); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:89 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984) (modern
definition); Maryland, Md. Ann. Code §§ 27-553, 27-554 (Michie 1982) ("sodomy" and "unnatural
and perverted sex practices"); Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 272, §§ 34, 35 (West 1970)
(common law definition); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338a, 730.338b
(2968) (common law definition); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.293-.294 (West Supp. 1984)
(modern definition); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (common law definition); Mis-
souri, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979) (modern definition); Montana, Mont. Code Ann
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prohibitions.
Recently, advocates of the decriminalization of sodomy urged the
Supreme Court to do what representative legislatures have refused to
do--change laws prohibiting homosexual conduct."1
In Bowers v. Hardwick, however, the Court refused, over a strongly
worded dissent by Justice Blackmun, to invalidate sodomy laws."1 This
Note analyzes the arguments in favor of an extension of the constitu-
tional right to privacy to homosexual conduct and examines the gov-
erning role that the Supreme Court assumes when it invalidates laws on
the basis of constitutional privacy. Part I examines the nature of our
constitutional government. Part II analyzes the creation of the constitu-
tional right to privacy and its articulated limitations. Part III examines
three approaches offered by Justice Blackmun to extend privacy protec-
tion to homosexual conduct. Finally, after a brief description of recent
legislative action, this Note concludes that an extension of constitutional
privacy protection to homosexual conduct would be unprincipled and
undemocratic judicial action.
I. THE MAJORITY-RULE PRINCIPLE.
The Constitution presupposes a system of representative government
based on the principle of majority rule. During the birth of the Constitu-
tion, some expressed concern over the effect of majoritarianism on mi-
nority interests. 2 They feared that political issues would be decided "not
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by
§ 45-5-505 (1984) (deviate sexual conduct); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1979) (homosexual
acts only); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-177 (1981) (common law definition); Oklahoma,
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983) (common law definition); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (common law definition); South Carolina, § C. Code Ann. § 16-15-120 (Law Coop.
1977) ("abominable crime of buggery"); Tennessee, Ten. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (common law
definition); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403, -406 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (modern definition); Wis-
consin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 944.17 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983-1984) (modern definition).
10. Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1982) (declared unconstitutional by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1985)). New
York, N.Y. Penal Law §§ 130.00, 130.38 (McKinney 1975) (criminal statute invalidated by the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.3d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981)); Pennsylvania, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1301, 1324 (1973)
(criminal statutes invalidated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bonadio,
490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980)); Texas, Tex. Penal Code Ann. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) (held
unconstitutional by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982)).
11. 54 U.S.L.W. 4919 (July 24, 1986).
12. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 77 (J. Madison) (Am. Lib. Ed. 1961). Madison, for example,
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the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."13 To pro-
tect against this danger, Madison urged adoption of the political struc-
ture contained in the proposed United States Constitution, a structure
calculated to divide and disperse political power among and between var-
ious levels of government. 14 The Bill of Rights supplemented this sophis-
ticated political protection by expressly protecting certain "rights of the
minor party" against invasion by the majority. 5
The majority-rule principle has operated as the centerpiece of Ameri-
can political freedom.16 At its most fundamental level, the majority-rule
principle creates a political environment where legal obligations reflect
the values of a community. 7 By appealing to citizens' sense of fairness,
the principle of majority rule contributes to political stability.'" Majority
rule also promotes consensus building and encourages pluralism by forc-
ing minority factions to bind together to achieve wider public support.' 9
"The majority," said Abraham Lincoln, "is the only true sovereign of a
free people."20
Despite the political norm of majority rule and its accompanying bene-
feared the power of political factions united by some "common impulse of passion" which would
ignore the "rights" of other citizens or the "aggregate interests" of the community. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The Constitution did not originally contain the Bill of Rights. Id. at 529-50. In responding
to arguments that a bill of rights should be included in the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton called
such an addition unnecessary. He argued that the establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the
prohibition of ex post facto laws, and the lack of titles of nobility were "greater securities to liberty
and republicanism." Hamilton explained that the Constitution's list of specific powers limited the
authority of the federal government, and that wise legislative discretion, regulated by public opinion,
would adequately restrict the exercise of those powers. THE FEDERALIST, No. 84, at 510-515 (A.
Hamilton) (Am. Lib. Ed. 1961).
16. The majority-rule principle is an indispensable ingredient in the daily functioning of gov-
ernment. Before a "bill" originating in either house of the United States Congress can become a
"law," it must first be approved by a majority vote in both houses of Congress; without such ap-
proval, the bill cannot be presented to the President for his consideration. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7,
Cl. 2.
The veto power of the executive and the requirement that a bill be approved by both houses of
Congress check the capacity of one house to enact a law by a simple majority vote of that house.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, Cl. 2.
17. Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understanding of Content, Authority, and
Constitutional Choice, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 226, 287-87 (1980). One commentator has suggested that
there "exists a 'fundamental right' to have the majority rule principle as the operative norm in
society." BUCHANAN, MORALITY, SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1983).
18. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
19. Id.
20. 3 SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 132 (1942).
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fits, the Constitution defines certain spheres in which our domestic soci-
ety has agreed to be ruled undemocratically. 21 For example, short of a
constitutional amendment, Americans cannot, however overwhelming
the majority, establish a state religion. The Constitution's first amend-
ment, as interpreted by an unelected Supreme Court, prohibits such ac-
tion. "We the People" have articulated a value judgment in the
Constitution-that church and state should be separate institutions.22
The Bill of Rights originally operated only to limit the power of the
federal government. After the Civil War, however, Congress enacted the
fourteenth amendment, in part, to increase constitutional authority of
states.23 The fourteenth amendment contains a "due process" clause
that24 courts originally interpreted in general terms to mean that govern-
ment cannot harm citizens unless it follows certain procedures.25
In Lochner v. New York, however, the Supreme Court discovered a
substantive component in the clause.26 The court found, implicit in the
word "liberty," certain unenumerated "fundamental" rights.27 For
thirty years, the Court employed this methodology, known as substantive
due process, to strike down economic and social legislation that violated
"fundamental" rights.28 Eventually, the Court expressly repudiated sub-
stantive due process and, in fact, continues to do so. 29 "'Lochnerizing"
allowed the courts to protect what it perceived as "fundamental" rights,
without textual or historical support from the Constitution.
A Supreme Court that makes rather than implements, fundamental
21. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
22. Admittedly, the Supreme Court faces far more difficult questions than this elementary hy-
pothetical. Nonetheless, that conclusion does not invalidate the basic premise that the Constitution
contains identifiable value choices which preclude legislative action.
23. See generally Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV.
L. REV. 366 (1911).
24. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1, cl. 3.
25. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT 19 (1980).
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
27. Id. at 48.
28. During the "Lochner era" the Court invalidated economic legislation which outlawed "yel-
low dog" contracts, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); set minimum wages for women, Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); and which prohibited the use of second-hand, unster-
ilized fabrics in the manufacture of bedding material, Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402
(1926).
29. See. eg., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963) ("the doctrine that prevailed in
Lochner ... that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely-has long been discarded").
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value choices cannot be squared with Madisonian government. 0 Such
action is neither inherently democratic nor constitutionally approved un-
democratic decisionmaking. The Constitution-its history, structure,
and language-is the beginning and the end of judicial responsibility. 31
In fact, in every opinion involving a constitutional question, the Supreme
Court asserts that the Constitution compels the result.32 The framers
specifically rejected the idea that the Court should be a "Council of Revi-
sion" with the authority to alter legislative policy.33 As a result, legisla-
tive judgments should stand, unless those judgments contravene a
principle "fairly discoverable" in the Constitution.34
II. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY FACADE
The Constitution does not contain an express right to privacy. It does
however, proscribe certain types of potentially intrusive government ac-
tion.35 The first proposal for creating a separate "right to privacy"
qmerged in 1890.36 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, fearing a dra-
30. Bork, supra note 21, at 6. Unless judicial decisions are based on principles "generally at-
tributable to the Constitution," unfettered decisionmaking, "which enables courts to impose unac-
ceptable values on the people," may result. Leede, A Critique of Ilegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 533, 540 (1983).
31. Id. at 8. ("The judge must stick close to the [Constitution's] text and the history, and their
implications, and not construct new rights.") See also Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradi-
tion, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972) (the judicial responsibility is to determine the present scope and
meaning of a decision that the nation, at an earlier time, articulated and enacted into constitutional
text).
32. Bork, supra note 21, at 3-4.
33. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 435-38 (1865). During the constitutional convention, some delegates ar-
gued that the judicial branch should be a "Council of Revision," a third legislative chamber with
revisionary power over all legislation it deemed "improper." In effect, the Council of Revision
would have given judges not only control over constitutional questions, but also control over legisla-
tive policy. The Convention rejected this concept of judicial authority. Id.
34. See J. ELY, supra note 25, at 2 (1980).
35. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolfi A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 929 n.3
(reference to privacy in the Bill of Rights pertains to ways in which the government can go about
collecting information). Under the third amendment, the federal government cannot forcibly quar-
ter soldiers in civilian homes in peacetime. U.S. Const. amend. III. The fourth amendment prohibits
the federal government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures" against citizens' "per-
sons, houses, papers and effects." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The fifth amendment prohibits compul-
sory confessions in criminal trials. US. Const. amend. V. Far from granting a general right to
privacy, however, these amendments govern activity in limited certain spheres. BRANT, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 3 (1965).
36. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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matic increase in unauthorized publicity, urged courts to recognize a sep-
arate common law remedy for invasions of personal "privacy." 37
Viewing the development of "instantaneous photographs" and the news-
paper enterprise as especially threatening to citizens' solitude, Warren
and Brandeis urged courts to recognize a right "to be let alone."' 38  Most
courts, finding "privacy" adequately protected by other causes of action,
balked at recognizing a separate right.
Seventy-five years later the United States Supreme Court discovered a
separate, constitutional right to privacy.3 9 The court, expressing grave
fears about physical and figurative intrusions into marital solitude, held
that states could not interfere with married couples' "private" use of con-
traceptives." In 1972, the Court moved away from its concern for mar-
riage and marital solitude, and found the right to privacy protects
individual decisions to purchase contraceptives.41 In 1973, the Court
ruled that constitutional privacy also includes the "right to decide" to
have an abortion.42 Constitutional "privacy" therefore prevents states
from prohibiting abortions, surgical procedures, performed in state-li-
censed hospitals and clinics, by state-licensed physicians.43 In short, the
Court's concern for "privacy" has moved from the solitude of the marital
bedroom to decisions carried out in public hospitals.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bowers v. Hardwick, argued that the
constitutional right to privacy includes the right to engage in homosexual
37. Id. at 195. More specifically, Warren and Brandeis feared an increase in the "unauthorized
circulation of portraits of private persons," a press "overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and decency," and the publishing of "unseemly gossip" which had resulted in
the "lowering of social standards and morality." Id.
38. Id. at 193. This phrase originated in COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). According to
Cooley: "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."
Cooley characterized the corresponding duty as, "not to inflict an injury and not, within such prox-
imity as might render it successful, to attempt the infliction of an injury." Id.
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. Id.
41. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
43. After Roe, the Supreme Court invalidated a number of state enactments on the basis of
violations of "privacy." See, eg., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75
(1976) (striking down a parental consent requirement for abortions performed on minors). The
Court also held that constitutional privacy not only prevents the states from interfering with the
abortion decision, but also prohibits the spouse from "interfering" as well. 428 U.S. at 69 (states
may not constitutionally require spousal consent for an abortion). In addition, the Danforth Court
struck down a provision which prohibited a particular abortion procedure, despite extensive lower
court and legislative findings that the procedure was dangerous. 428 U.S. at 95-99 (White, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part).
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sodomy.' The Constitution, according to Justice Blackmun, prohibits
states from interfering with "intimate behavior" that does not take place
in public.45
Justice Blackmun offered three general bases for his conclusion: first,
the constitutionalization of John Stuart Mill's principle of liberty; 46 sec-
ond, a judicial ban on legislating "private morality; ' 47 and, finally, im-
plicit constitutional values protecting intimate relationships.48 Adoption
of these principles, however, would invade the province of legislative
decisionmaking and allow the Court to impose its values on a reluctant
public.
III. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S BASES FOR EXPANDING
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Constitutionalization of John Stuart Mill's Principle of Liberty
The dissenters in Bowers would have the Court constitutionalize the
contemporary version of John Stuart Mill's libertarian principle of lib-
erty. Mill proposed that governments could only regulate individual be-
havior that "harms others."49  Justice Blackmun wrote that nothing
justified the conclusion that homosexuality is "physically dangerous,
either to the persons engaged in it or to others."5 In short, the dissent-
ers would have held that states cannot, consistent with the Constitution,
regulate behavior unless it is harmful.
This constitutionalization of Mill's principle would transfer to the ju-
diciary the broad responsibility of determining whether individual behav-
ior constitutes sufficient harm to warrant legal prohibition. When the
Bowers dissenters concluded that "private" homosexuality is not harm-
ful, they ignored two critical questions, namely, what is a "sufficient
harm" and who should decide what is harmful. The dissenters, by con-
cluding that homosexual conduct is not harmful, either meant that ho-
44. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4924-25.
45. Id. at 4926-27. ("[Ihe mere fact that intimate behavior may be punished when it takes
place in public cannot dictate [state regulation ofl intimate behavior that occurs in intimate places.")
46. Id. at 4925-26.
47. Id. at 4926.
48. Id. at 4924-25.
49. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Lib. Arts Ed. 1956). To his basic proposition, Mill added the
corollary that government should not enact purely "paternalistic" laws. Mills sought to articulate
one basic principle that could "govern absolutely" the extent to which society could control individ-
uals. Id.
50. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4925-26.
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mosexuality is completely without social effects, or that the effects are
not "harmful" enough to justify legal sanction. The former conclusion is
absurd, the latter a determination only for an elected legislature.
Homosexuality clearly "affects" society. "Homosexuality," according
to one commentator, is a "continuous aspect of personality or per-
sonhood that usually requires expression across the public/private spec-
trum.""1 As one author observed, the gay experience "provides an
opportunity to question traditional lifestyles and values and create an
individual lifestyle based on personal knowledge and clarified social val-
ues. ' ' 52 Legal recognition of an alternative "lifestyle," by definition, af-
fects the character of society.
The question of what constitutes sufficient justification for legal prohi-
bition is a question for the legislature. To begin with, the constitutional-
ization of Mill's principle confuses political philosophy with
constitutional principles. Legislators may vote against a mandatory mo-
torcycle helmet law based on a personal belief that the legislation is an
unjust interference with personal autonomy. The Constitution, however,
does not compel the same result.5 3 The Constitution54 allows states to
enact even paternalistic laws to protect the "health, safety, morals, and
general welfare" of their citizens.55 Constitutionalization of Mill's prin-
ciple would call into question the validity of numerous statutes com-
monly thought to be within states' police power, including compulsory
51. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classifi-
cation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1890 (1985).
52. NUNGUESSER, HOMOSEXUAL ACTS, ACTORS, AND IDENTITIES Viii.
53. See, e.g., Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 709
(1969). See also Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30
OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1969). Comment, Society's Right to Protect an Individualfrom Himself, 2 CONN.
L. REV. 150 (1969). See generally Comment, States' Power to Require an Individual to Protect Him-
self, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 112 1969).
54. The Constitution provides: "Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the broad powers left to the states. In GIBBONS V. OGDEN,
9 Wheat 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) Chief Justice John Marshall explained that residual state powers
include "an immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State."
Id at 72.
55. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). The Court identified public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, and law and order as some of the more conspicuous examples of states'
police power. The Court also explained that the legislature, not the judiciary is the main guardian of
the public's needs. Id.
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seat belt laws, compulsory physical and mental treatment, and prohibi-
tions on the use of allegedly harmful substances.
More importantly, legislatures should determine whether certain be-
havior harms society because the question of what constitutes "harm"
often involves moral judgments about empirical evidence. A conclusion
that homosexual conduct justifies prohibition of criminal penalties in-
volves especially difficult value judgments about the empirical evidence
on the social effects of homosexuality. First, the exact cause and charac-
ter of homosexuality is unknown. Psychiatrists do not agree whether
homosexuality, properly understood, is a lifestyle, a preference, an ill-
ness, a sociopolitical movement or a biological predisposition. 6 More-
over, any medical judgment declaring the exact pathological status of
homosexuality is most likely already politicized. 7
Second, social theorists have long studied the repression of certain sex-
ual behaviors and disagreed over its significance and effects. Freud, for
example, theorized that communal life depends on sexual repression..
Western societies, according to Freud, sought to divert energy from sex-
ual activity to social uses such as work. 9 Restricting sexual gratification
to heterosexual, genital, monagamous sex, although a "serious injustice"
to those desiring alternate sexual gratification, also stabilized society by
creating de-sexualized social ties. 60 These bonds are necessary, according
to Freud, to dampen man's inherent aggressiveness towards other mem-
bers of society.61
Other social theorists have concluded that capitalism is especially de-
pendent on the repression of sexual excesses, such as homosexuality.62
Max Weber located the creation of capitalism in the coming of Protes-
56. See generally MEYER, EGo-DYSTONIC HOMOSEXUALITY, IN COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 1056 (H. Kaplan & B. Saddock, 4th ed. 1985) (a firm pathological understanding of
homosexuality is marked by a fundamental lack of consensus).
57. R. BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS
(1981) ("A. furious egalitarianism [compels] psychiatric experts to negotiate the pathological status
of homosexuality with homosexuals themselves.").
58. S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 51 (3. Strachey trans. 1961). Freud ob-
served, for example, that the continuation of family life depended on a prohibition of incest. Freud
called this prohibition "the most dramatic mutilation of man's erotic life." Id
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 56.
62. Emile Durkheim contended that society could not be maintained unless some of human-
kind's strongest inclinations--"the obscure, mysterious, forbidding character of the sexual act"-
were controlled. LUKE, EMILE DURKHEIM, HIS LIFE AND WORK, A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL
SURVEY 533 (1972).
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tant religion and its accompanying prohibitions on certain types of sexual
expression.63 Protestantism infused work with religious significance, and
strove to deflect persons' energy from erotic tendencies. 64 This sexual
repression repudiated all nonprocreative "idolatry of the flesh."' 65 Daniel
Bell has recently described the clash between a productive economy and
a polity dependent upon work on the one hand, and a consumptive eco-
nomic culture stressing hedonism on the other.66 Joseph Schumpeter has
predicted difficulty in sustaining capitalism in a culture of rootless and
childless apartment dwellers.67
Finally, the recent appearance of the disease AIDS (Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome), which vividly shows that homosexuality is not
without social or individual costs, complicates any analysis of the effects
of homosexuality. 68 AIDS is a deadly disease with no known cure.69 The
spread of the disease is epidemic, as the number of reported cases doubles
every six months.70 Anyone may contract the disease,7" but the over-
whelming majority of cases involve men who have engaged in homosex-
ual conduct.7" Given the high incidence of the disease among
homosexuals, some commentators have proposed stricter prohibitions on
sodomy as a means to control the disease.73
63. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 166-67 (T. Parsons
trans. 1930).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 169.
66. D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTION OF CAPITALISM 71-72 (1976).
67. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY chs. XI-XIV (1950).
68. See generally Note, AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality?, 11 J. CONTEMP. L.
315 (1984). Note, Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses:
A Constitutional Analysis, GOLD. GATE U. L. REV. 301 (1985).
69. Landesman and Vieira, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): A Review, 143
ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 2307 (1983). Seventy percent of patients diagnosed before January, 1983
have died. Over 72% of the victims were male homosexuals, especially those with multiple sexual
partners. 33 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Update: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)-United States, No. 47 (Nov. 30, 1984).
70. Flaherty, A Legal Emergency Brewing Over AIDS, 6 NAT'L L.J. 44 (July 9, 1984).
71. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 69, at 2308.
72. Selik, Haverkos and Curran, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Trends in the
U.S., 1978-1982, 76 AM. J. MED. 394 (1984). Men who have had homosexual contact constitute
70% of reported cases. Id. at 499. The high level of promiscuity among homosexuals compounds
the problem. Jaffe, Choi, and Thomas et al., National Case Control Study of Kkapsoi's Sarcoma and
Pneumocystis Canini in Homosexual Males, Part I and I, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 145 (1933)
(the control group averaged 25 partners per year while bathhouse customers averaged 65 sexual
partners per year).
73. See, e.g., Robinson, quoted in Bar Ass'n for Human Rights of Greater New York, LEs-
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Representative legislatures, not unelected judges, should evaluate the
evidence on the effects of homosexual conduct and decide whether
prohibitions are justified.74 Judicial imposition of Mill's principle would
improperly redistribute the constitutional authority to determine what
constitutes prohibitable conduct from the legislatures to an unelected
judiciary.
B. A Judicial Ban on Legislating Morality
Another principle offered by the dissenters in Bowers to expand the
Court's privacy protection characterizes the right to privacy as a judicial
ban on states' legislating private morality. Justice Blackmun criticized
the majority for failing to see a constitutional difference between "public
sensibilities" and "private morality."75
The general assertion that the Supreme Court has, or can, prohibit
states from legislating morality represents a misunderstanding of the na-
ture of law, morality, and the relationship between the two. Law fre-
quently reflects social norms, or "morals." Most law is moral legislation
insofar as it conditions actions and thoughts in conformity with those
social norms.76 States enact laws and implement policies that proscribe,
BrAN/GAY LAW NOTES 1 (Jan. 1986). Professor Robinson suggests that: "the only rational means
of responding to this extraordinary tragedy [of AIDS] is to change our behavior. The behavior
believed to have infected about three fourths of the victims is sodomy ....." He argues that states
should be allowed to enact sodomy statutes to restrict "potentially lethal behavior" and to close
bathhouses and bars where "promiscuous, extraordinarily risky sexual activity takes place." Id. See
also Note, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes are Constitutional, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645,
650 n.41 (1985). "As the incidence of AIDS increases in the homosexual community and as bisexual
members of that community carry the disease to the population at large, the enforcement of sodomy
statutes may become a primary alternative in the containment of this disease." Id.
74. The debate over the American Law Institute's proposed Model Penal Code illustrates the
appropriate forum for discussing whether to prohibit homosexual conduct. The ALI opposed the
criminalization of homosexual conduct because it did not involve force, adult corruption of minors,
or offenses committed in public. The drafters, acknowledging Mill's principle, concluded that com-
munities were not harmed by atypical sex practices that occurred in seclusion between consenting
adults. This proposal set off a furious debate. Some argued that the "suppression of vice" is neces-
sary because violation of society's moral structure undermines the "very basis" of that society. On
the other hand, proponents of decriminalization adhering to Mill's principle, argued that regulation
was unjustified because such conduct, which they perceived as "private," did not harm society. In
the end, state legislatures decided to accept or reject the ALI report. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5
commentary at 277 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
75. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4926.
76. G. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT 19-20 (1985). See also R. POUND, THE PHILOSo-
PHY OF LAW 71 (1922). Law is "a system of ordering human conduct and adjusting human rela-
tions beyond merely individual feelings or desires." Id.
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mandate, regulate, and subsidize individual behavior that will, over time,
nurture, bolster, or alter habits, dispositions, and values on a public
scale.7
7
The Constitution, the dissenters in Bowers nonetheless argued, prohib-
its states from regulating "private," as opposed to public, morality. Such
a distinction, however, does not exist. Morals regulate conduct, com-
manding individuals to engage in or refrain from certain behavior. This
behavior, even if based on "personal" desires, is inherently "public. 78
The moral virtue of courage, for example although based in the personal
quality of fearlessness, manifests itself in "public" behavior conditioned
on this quality. Similarly, while the source of homosexuality is a "per-
sonal" desire to engage in sex with a person of the same gender, homo-
sexuality manifests itself in the "public" behavior of expressing a desire
for and engaging in sex with other persons. All private morals, therefore,
are also public morals.79 "Morals" exist only within the awareness of
other members of society; they mean nothing to a person in isolation.
Dividing morality into two categories, the morality of aspiration and
the morality of duty, provides a more useful model for understanding the
relationship between law and morality.8" The morality of aspiration is
"the morality of the Good Life, of Excellence, or the fullest realization of
human powers."'" When a man fails to achieve all that to which he
"aspires" he is merely guilty of a shortcoming, but not of wrongdoing.
77. G. WILL, supra note 76, at 20.
78. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 59-60 (1978).
The social character of morals is sometimes called into question by pointing to those
moral norms that prescribe a behavior not toward other individuals but toward oneself-
such as the norms that prohibit suicide or prescribe courage or chastity. The behavior of
the individual, which these norms prescribe, refers directly-it is true-only to this indi-
vidual; but indirectly to other members of the community. For this behavior becomes the
object of a moral norm in the consciousness of the community, only because of its conse-
quences on the community. Even the so-called obligations toward oneself are social obliga-
tions. They would be meaningless for an individual living in isolation.
Id.
79. Id. The fallacy of the private/public distinction is also apparent in the context of abortion
rights:
The law can treat abortions as private transactions between women and their doctors. The
law cannot, however, make the consequences- l.7 million abortions a year; a new casual-
ness about the conceiving and disposing of life; transformed attitudes about sex, relations
between sexes, and the claims of family and children-the law cannot make those "pri-
vate" consequences.
G. WILL, supra note 76, at 87. Decisions to abort fetuses thus become part of the social conscious-
ness of the community and of its social norms.
80. See generally FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (1964).
81. Id. at 6.
Number 4] 1245
Washington University Open Scholarship
1246 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:1233
The morality of duty, on the other hand, lays down the basic rules with-
out which an ordered society is impossible. The morality of duty, there-
fore, condemns citizens for failing to respect the basic requirements of
social living.82
Society determines when to turn moral obligations into legal obliga-
tions. The law cannot force all citizens to lead "perfect" lives,8 3 but leg-
islatures routinely use legal sanctions to "heighten" the moral aspirations
of individuals.14 When legislatures take such measures diverse political
interests can battle over the point at which legal pressure should end and
the challenge of personal excellence begins.8"
In some cases, the Constitution prohibits legislatures from imposing
majoritarian morality on citizens. For example, suppose a state decides
to expand its road system to increase economic activity in a poverty-
stricken region of the state. The state cannot force citizens to donate
land, without compensation, for an interstate highway. Such forced be-
nevolence would violate the "taking clause" of the fifth amendment.86
The judiciary must intervene and enforce a constitutionally predeter-
mined value judgment.87
A state's decision to prohibit sodomy, however, does not violate any
82. Id.
83. Id. at 9. Fuller wrote, "There is no way to compel a man to live up to the excellence of
which he is capable." As an example, Fuller states that society cannot compel citizens to live lives of
reason. Id.
84. In the 1960s for example, Congress enacted civil rights legislation, primarily to improve the
condition of black Americans. Congress also sought, however, to change the "immoral" racial atti-
tudes of many white Americans. Congress accomplished its goals by forcing races to eat, live, and
study together. Desegregation and the civil rights laws explicitly and successfully changed individu-
als' moral beliefs by compelling them to change their behavior. Congress improved society by inte-
grating the races, and also heightened the moral aspirations of citizens by effectuating a change in
moral attitudes. See Selections from Hearings before Senate Commerce Committees in July and Au-
gust of 1963, in GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159-162 (1 1th ed. 1985).
85. FULLER, supra note 80, at 10; G. WILL, supra note 76, at 87. See also Buchanan, Same-Sex
Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 541, 559 (1985).
Political philosophers have long disagreed over the appropriate role of government in encouraging
citizens to lead "Good" lives. Edmund Burke, for example, argued that "the principles of true
politics are those of morality enlarged." 1 BURKE, CORRESPONDENCE 332 (William ed. 1944). Ber-
trand Russel, however, condemned a high level of government interference in moral issues. B. Rus-
SEL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS 291 (1929).
86. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). Ironically, at the same time the
Supreme Court is restricting the authority of states to make certain social judgments, the Court is
expanding the authority of the states concerning certain economic matters. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 227 (1984) (The public purpose of breaking up land oligarchies
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constitutional limitation on majoritarian morality. Sodomy laws, at the
very least, manifest society's displeasure with homosexual conduct and
reinforce social values.88 The law provides citizens with the moral gratifi-
cation of living in a state which prohibits behavior they feel is morally
wrong. The Constitution is silent on the question of the social propriety
of homosexuality, and therefore the Court has no mandate to intervene.
No principle identifiable in the text or history of the Constitution makes
homosexuals' sexual gratification more important than other citizens'
moral gratification.89
Constitutional protection of conduct that society deems morally defi-
cient undermines the capacity of the majority to achieve the levels of
moral excellence to which it aspires.90 The moral choices of citizens,
made through their elected representatives, should make or change
laws.9' Where the Constitution is silent, unelected judges have no man-
date to impose their moral preferences upon a people who have made a
different moral assessment.92
satisfied the "public use" requirement for governmental takings, even though the land ended up in
private hands.).
88, RADZINOWICZ, SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN AND His CONTRIBUTION TO THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW 229-30 (1957). "The sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment
of the public in relation to any offense what a seal is to hot wax. It converts into a judgment what
otherwise might be a transcient sentiment." Id. See also Buchanan, supra note 87, at 559 ("It is
hard to condemn what the law permits").
89. Bork, supra note 21, at 10. Bork explains that absent a moral or ethical principle embodied
in the Constitution, community judgments must stand. Ia
90. Buchanan, supra note 85, at 559.
91. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921) (A judge "is not a
knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles.") See also Dronenberg v. Zeck, 741 F.2d at 1397. (Bork,
J.). "If the revolution in sexual mores... is in fact ever to arrive .... it must arrive through the
moral choices of the people and their elected representatives, not through the ukase of [a] court."
Id. The danger of equating the courts' perceived moral superiority with its legal power is that the
"morally superior judge" will be one who imposes a set of "authoritarian ethics" on an unconsenting
public. Leede, supra note 30, at 549.
92. Plato proposed a political system ruled by "philosopher kings." These rules, according to
Plato's plan, would make wiser decisions that those made by a majority in a representative form of
government. Plato contended that it is possible to device a political system that would generate a
continuing procession of philosopher kings as rules. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 205-11 (F. Cornford
ed. 1961).
Judge Learned Hand once observed: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy
of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." L. HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). See also Bork, Judge Bork Replies, 1984 A.B.A. J. 132 (explaining
his 1971 article, Bork, supra note 21).
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C. Extra-Constitutional "Traditions" as the Basis for Overturning
Legislative Judgments Jurisprudence
The Bowers dissenters would also have applied an elastic form of "tra-
dition-based" jurisprudence. Justice Blackmun, relying heavily on an ar-
ticle written by Professor Karst, attempted to identify an individual
freedom to choose the "form and nature" of "intensely personal
bonds."93 Justice Blackmun rooted this freedom in what he perceived as
the nation's values.94
In general, tradition-based jurisprudence, unattached to constitutional
guidelines, is inconsistent with Madisonian government. Tradition-based
jurisprudence allows a judge to arrive at almost any conclusion that he is
predisposed to make.95 Because no finite set of indicia exists to define
what are "traditions," judges decide the content of controlling tradi-
tions.96 Moreover, if a judge can arbitrarily choose which indicia of tra-
dition to use, or if a judge simply ca.mot identify controlling
"traditions,"97 his own values, and not the Constitution, guide his
decisionmaking.
Even assuming that judges can identify traditions, such jurisprudence
is inherently undemocratic. It is hard to square the theory of our govern-
ment with the notion that yesterday's majority (assuming it was a major-
ity) should control today's. 98
Professor Karst, advocates extending privacy protection to certain "in-
timate associations." 99 He defines an intimate association as "a close and
93. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4924.
94. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4927.
95. See generally Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39-43 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ely, Discovering Fundamental
Values].
96. See Christie, A Model of Judicial Review of Legislation, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1306, 1320
(1975) ("Assuming that society does have a fundamental commitment to 'those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples; what specific conclu-
sions follow. Certainly those same standards could and have permitted the exclusion of Negroes
from juries.") See also Betts. v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (the majority and dissenting opinions
reached opposite conclusions on whether American traditions required the appointment of counsel
for those who could not afford it).
97. Ely, Discovering Fundamental Values, supra note 94, at 39 (1978) (noting the "tremendous
uncertainties in ascertaining anything very concrete" about past intellectual or moral climates.").
98. Id. at 42.
99. Karst, The Freedom of Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1983). Professor Tribe reaches the
same result by defining tradition in such meaningless terms that it will apply to almost anything.
Tribe admits that the history of homosexuality is one of "disapproval and disgrace," but circumvents
the obstacle by proposing to raise the definition of tradition to a higher "level of generality." This
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familiar personal relationship that is in some significant way comparable
to a marriage or family relationship."" ° To determine whether an "inti-
mate association" is entitled to constitutional protection, Karst relies on
four values: society,'O° caring and commitment,10 2 self-identification, 0 3
and intimacy."° These values come from a "sense of collectivity," the
"shared sense that 'we' exist beyond 'you' and 'me'."105 Karst finds these
values present in a homosexual relationship and concludes that the Con-
stitution protects the act of sodomy from criminal penalties.
0 6
Simply stated, "the shared sense that 'we' exist beyond 'you' and
'me' " is a principle based on a value preference rather than on a princi-
ple identifiable in the history, language, or structure of the Constitution.
Notwithstanding Karst's elaborate collection of historical references to
certain values, the simple fact is that twenty-four state legislatures con-
tinue to make the value judgment that sodomy is a crime.10 7 Professor
Karst's conglomeration of vague values does not justify judicial nullifica-
tion of those legislative judgments.
IV. THE RECENT POLITICAL RESPONSE TO SODOMY STATUTES
Illinois, in 1962, decriminalized private sexual conduct between adult
homosexuals. 108 Since 1979, twenty-five states have decriminalized ho-
mosexual conduct.'0 9 Whether due to improved medical understanding,
the sexual revolution, or political pressure from gay rights activists, legis-
latures have responded to political pressure. In 1980 and 1984, for exam-
ple, the Democratic Party included a gay rights plank in its national
permits, according to Tribe, "unconventional variants" to claim the same constitutional protection
as "mainstream versions" of conduct. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-13, at
944-946 (1978). Through semantic gymnastics he arrives at the bizarre conclusion that what is
"traditional" includes what is "unconventional."
100. Id. at 630. Karst defines society as the opportunity to enjoy the company of certain people,
an "expectation of access" to another person's physical presence. Id.
101. Id. at 632. "Caring and commitment," according to Karst, is the chief value. In essence,
"caring and commitment" is living and being loved. Id.
102. Id. at 634. Self-identification is the formation and shaping of an individual's identity. As-
sociations, Karst asserts, profoundly affect our personalities and senses of self. Id.
103. Id. Intimacy is the context of caring which makes the sharing of personal information sig-
nificant. Id.
104. Id. at 630.
105. Id. at 682.
106. See supra note 9.
107. See supra note 8.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 9 accompanying text.
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platform. In fact, homosexuals enjoy political dominance in certain re-
gions of the country. At the same time, twenty-four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have chosen to retain laws which prohibit some form of
sexual contact between persons of the same sex. These states, for
whatever reasons, continue to prefer a society in which sodomy is prohib-
ited. The mere reluctance of states to change, however, is not a constitu-
tional mandate for judicial intervention.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hardwick, if followed, would reaffirm
Lochner in American jurisprudence behind the facade of protecting pri-
vacy. Statutes that currently prohibit homosexual conduct reflect socie-
tal value judgments concerning the propriety of a particular form of
behavior. Absent a conflicting constitutional value the majority-rule
principle allows such determinations to govern. The Supreme Court's
only role is to invalidate legislative acts which contravene principles em-
bodied in that Constitution. Nullifying sodomy statutes, on the basis of a
"fundamental" right to privacy, would unprincipledly and undemocrati-
cally replace centuries-old values with those of an unelected Court.' 10
Alan J. Wertjes
110. F. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARv. L. REV. 33, 58 (1931).
Frankfurter wrote:
The veto power of the Supreme Court over the socioeconomic legislation of the states,
when exercised by a narrow conception of the due process and equal protection of the law
clauses, presents undue centralization in its most destructive and least responsible form.
The most destructive, because it stops experiment at its source, preventing an increase of
social knowledge by the only scientific method available; namely the tests of trial and error.
The least responsible, because it often turns on the fortuitous circumstances which deter-
mine a majority decision, and shelters the fallible judgment of individual justices, in mat-
ters of fact and opinion not peculiarly within the competence of the judges behind the
impersonal authority of the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
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